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I.

Introduction

Congress often enacts tax laws in order to affect people’s behavior in one
way or another. However, tax legislation frequently produces outcomes that
Congress may neither foresee nor desire. This article describes how the
temporary cut in the tax on corporate dividends has produced just such an
unanticipated outcome.1 The law was promoted as a way toreduce undesirable
tax planning by corporations.2 However, it has also created an opportunity for
the rich to improperly avoid tax when they work for a corporation they also own
and control.
An individual who owns and works for a corporation has at least two
ways to access the earnings of the business. As a shareholder, he can access the
earnings by receiving a dividend on his stock. Alternatively, as an employee, he
can withdraw earnings in the form of compensation, such as a salary or bonus.
Before the cut in the tax on dividends, such an employee-shareholder almost
always had an incentive to access the earnings as compensation. However, the
cut in the dividend tax reversed the incentives for many employee-shareholders.
There is now a substantial economic incentive for high income employeeshareholders to substitute dividends for the compensation they would have
otherwise paid themselves. Ironically, certain rich individuals can get richer by
working for free.
Although the cut in the dividend tax created an incentive for some to
substitute a dividend for a bonus, the tax cut itself it not the source of the
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problem. Rather, the tax cut has merely cast a light on the inconsistent and
problematic way that federal employment tax rules apply to individuals who
work for a business they also own and control. Such employee-owners currently
are subject to a different set of rules depending on the legal form used to operate
the business. In addition, if the business operates as a partnership, an employeeowner’s employment tax liability also depends on whether he is a general
partner or a limited partner. To make matters worse, it is not clear what rules
apply to an employee-owner of a business operated through a limited liability
company.
It is widely acknowledged that the employment tax rules should be made
more clear and consistent. However, all past proposals for correcting this
problem have not addressed it in a comprehensive way, focusing instead on
adjustments that would make the rules apply uniformly only to individuals who
work for a business they conduct through an entity other than a taxable
corporation.3 Such business forms generally include partnerships, S corporations
and limited liability companies. These proposals are an improvement over the
current situation. However, because they fail to address an advantage enjoyed
by individuals who own and work for a business conducted through a taxable
corporation, these proposals represent only a partial solution to the problem.
This article will propose a uniform set of employment tax rules that
should apply to all individuals who work for a business they own and control.
Before doing so, the article will examine the current rules that determine how the
earnings of a business are taxed when received by an owner who also works for
the business. This will require an examination of two sets of rules. First, there
are rules that tax the owner’s share of the profits of the business. Second, there
are rules that tax amounts paid to the owner as compensation for services
rendered to the business. This discussion will reveal how the use of different
business entities, different ownership interests and different payout forms can
affect what an employee-owner pays as tax and what he keeps after tax. The
article will then describe and critique a widely endorsed proposal for eliminating
the inconsistencies in the current system of tax rules that apply to employeeowners of non-taxable business entities.
Next, the article shows how a shareholder who works for a solely owned
corporation enjoys a significant opportunity to avoid employment tax that other
employee-owners do not enjoy. Among other things, the discussion will
demonstrate how the temporary dividend tax cut has created an incentive for an
employee-shareholder to access the earnings of the business by substituting
dividends for any compensation he would otherwise want to receive in the
absence of the tax cut. Moreover, the discussion reveals how this outcome has a
considerable class bias in two respects. First, high income individuals are
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considerably more likely to be in a position to make this tax-saving substitution.
Second, when they do take advantage of it, these high-income employeeshareholders save far more tax dollars than their lower income counterparts
would. The article concludes by advancing a proposal that would make
employment tax rules apply uniformly to all individuals who work for a
business they also own.
II.

Taxation of Business Profits to an Employee-Owner

When an individual works for a business that he also owns, several
federal laws may apply to extract a tax on the earnings of the business. The total
tax extracted will determine how much the employee-owner has left to spend on
personal items unrelated to the business. There are two sets of tax rules to
consider. First there are income taxes that apply. These taxes may be imposed
on the employee-owner, the business, or both. Second, there are federal
employment taxes that may also come into play to the extent the earnings of the
business are treated as the employee-owner’s income from labor. The following
sections describe the pertinent aspects of each set of rules.
A.

Income Taxes on the Profits of a Business

State law recognizes several vehicles through which a business can be
conducted, including the sole proprietorship, various forms of the partnership,
the limited liability company, and the corporation. Each business form offers a
different mix of features that may affect how suitable it may be for any given
situation and how attractive it may be to the owners of the business. One factor
that the ownersof any business are likely to consider is the extent to which the
earnings of the business will be subject to the income tax. The rules that apply in
any given situation will depend in the first instance on the state law business
form used to operate the enterprise. The state law business form will dictate the
default tax rules that will govern how the profits of the business are taxed.
However, in most cases, the business can choose whether it wants an alternative
set of rules to apply.
The Internal Revenue Code employs two alternative models for taxing the
profits of a business. The first is the corporate model, which treats the business
entity and its owners as separate and distinct taxpaying units. As a result, the
business itself is subject to tax on any profits it makes. 4 In addition, the owners
are subject to tax on any profits that the business actually pays to them as a
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return on their investment.5 The corporate model is the default system of
taxation that applies when a business operates through a corporation.6
The two-tiered structure embodied by the corporate model stands in
contrast to the flow through model of taxation. It does not treat the business
entity as a taxpaying unit. Instead, the owners of the business are taxed on their
share of the profits of the enterprise, whether or not the business actually pays
any of theseprofits to them. The Internal Revenue Code contains several
versions of the flow-through model of taxation. This article will address three.7
There are the rules that apply to sole proprietors, there are the rules that apply to
partnerships, and there are the provisions of subchapter S.
Federal tax law does not consider a sole proprietor to be a separate
business entity.8 As a result, any income or loss of the business is merely
included in the computation of the owner’s individual income tax liability.9 Any
limited liability company that has only one member is treated as a sole proprietor
for federal income tax purposes.10 However, such a single member limited
liability company can choose to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax
purposes, which would bring the corporate model of tax into play.11 If a
business operates through a partnership or a limited liability company that has
more than one owner, the business profits are taxed under the partnership
version of the flow through model.12 However, any such business has the option
to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.13 When this
option is chosen, the corporate model of taxation applies exclusively. If a
corporation meets certain eligibility requirements, it can choose to be subject to
the flow-through provisions of subchapter S.14
Unless indicated otherwise, the next several sections use the term
corporation to refer to any business entity (other than an S corporation) that is
treated as such for federal income tax purposes, regardless of the state law
business form through which the enterprise is conducted. Likewise, the article
uses the term partnership to refer only to those state law partnerships that have
not elected to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. In
addition, the term limited liability company refers to any such company with
5
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more than one owner that has not elected to be treated as a corporation for
federal income tax purposes. Finally, the term sole proprietor refers to any sole
proprietor and any single owner limited liability company that has not elected to
be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.
1.

Taxation of the Profits of a Corporation

As a general proposition, there are two separate income taxes that apply
to the profits of a business conducted through a corporation. First, the
corporation itself has to pay an income tax on what it earns.15 Second, a
shareholder must pay an income tax on any after tax profits that the corporation
pays to him as a dividend.16 This two-tiered tax structure is one of the hallmarks
of the U.S. corporate tax scheme.
The corporate tax applies only to the taxable income of a corporation.17
Taxable income refers generally to revenues, reduced by the firm’s cost of goods
sold and certain expenses allowed by law.18 Among other things, a corporation
can deduct amounts paid as compensation to any employee (including an
employee-owner) for services rendered to the business.19 The principal
restriction is that the deduction is limited to amounts that are reasonable for the
services performed.20 Thus, a corporation’s taxable income gets reduced to the
extent it pays compensation to its employees, resulting in a lower tax bill.
The corporate tax itself is determined under a system of marginal rates
that applies to the corporation’s taxable income. Under this structure, a
corporation’s taxable income consists of several different layers of income, each
of which is taxed at a different rate. The first layer consists of all income up to
$50,000, which is taxed at 15 percent.21 The second layer consists of all income
over $50,000 and up to $75,000, which is taxed at 25 percent.22 Each successive
layer covers a higher range of taxable income, starting where the preceding layer
left off. And the statute prescribes a different rate that applies to each of these
layers. The marginal rates range from a low of 15 percent to a high of 39 percent.
The following table summarizes the range of taxable income covered by each
layer and the tax rate that applies to each layer.23
Corporate Income Tax Rates
Taxable Income
Tax
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Over
$0
$50,000
$75,000
$100,000
$335,000
$10,000,000
$15,000,000
$18,333,333

Up to
$50,000
$75,000
$100,000
$335,000
$10,000,000
$15,000,000
$18,333,333
unlimited

Rate
15%
25%
34%
39%
34%
35%
38%
35%

Thus, if a corporation has $150,000 of taxable income, that income will
consist of four layers. The first $50,000 will be taxed at 15 percent, the next
$25,000 will be taxed at 15 percent, the next $25,000 will be taxed at 34 percent,
and the last $50,000 will be taxed at 39 percent.
Any profits that remain after the corporate tax has been extracted will be
subject to tax again if they are paid to the shareholder as a dividend.24 The
amount the shareholder pays in tax will depend on several factors. The first
consideration is the year when the dividends are paid. Different rules apply
depending on the year the dividend is paid.
Dividends paid before 2003 and after 2008 are taxed under the same rules
that apply to all income of the shareholder other than gains from the sale of
capital assets held for over a year.25 Such ordinary income is subject to tax under
a system of marginal rates, similar to the system of marginal rates that applies to
corporations.26 Thus, the tax only applies to the extent the shareholder has
taxable income. The taxable income of an individual generally includes all
income (other than those items that are expressly exempt from tax) reduced by
any deductions, exclusions and exemptions allowed by law.27 Dividends
received on corporate stock are included in the computation of taxable income.28
An individual’s taxable income consists of several different layers of
income, each of which is taxed at a different rate. The personal income tax
imposes a set of marginal tax rates that is different from the rates imposed under
the corporate income tax. In addition, each marginal rate applies to a different
range of income depending on an individual’s filing status. There are four
categories into which an individual tax return can fall: Married Individual’s
Filing a Joint Return, Heads of Households, Unmarried Individuals, and Married
Individuals Filing a Separate Return. In each case, the there are six marginal tax
rates ranging from 10 percent to 35 percent. The following table summarizes the
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six ranges of taxable income and the tax rate that applies to each range in the case
of married individuals who file a joint return in 2006.29
2006 Income Tax Rates
Married Individuals Filing Jointly
Taxable Income
Tax
Rate
Over
Up to
$0
$15,100
10%
$15,100
$61,300
15%
$61,300
$123,700
25%
$123,700
$188,450
28%
$188,450
$336,550
33%
unlimited
35%
$336,550

Thus, a married couple with $100,000 of combined taxable income in 2006
will be taxed at 10 percent on the first $15,100. A 15 percent tax will apply to the
next $46,200 of taxable income. And a 25 percent tax will apply to the last
$38,700 of taxable income. Those six separate rate categories are in effect through
2010. After 2010, the schedule will be replaced with the one that was in effect
from 1993 to 2000.30 That schedule contained the following five marginal rates:
15 percent, 28 percent, 31 percent, 36 percent and 39.6 percent.31 There were
transitory schedules that applied in 2001 and 2002, each one containing six
marginal rates. For 2001, the marginal rates were 10 percent, 15 percent, 27.5
percent, 30.5 percent, 35.5 percent and 39.1 percent. For 2002, the marginal rages
were 10 percent, 15 percent, 27 percent, 30 percent, 35 percent and 38.6 percent.32
If a shareholder receives a corporate dividend after 2003 and before 2008,
the dividend can be taxed in one of two ways, depending on how long the
shareholder owned the stock in the dividend paying corporation. If the
shareholder owned the stock for less than 61 days, the dividend will comprise
part of the shareholder’s ordinary income, making itsubject to tax under the
marginal rates just described.33 However, in most cases where the shareholder
owned the stock for at least 61 days, dividends paid on the stock will be taxed at
the same rate that applies to gains from the sale of stock and other capital assets
held for over one year.34 That rate varies depending on the top marginal tax rate
that applies to the shareholder’s ordinary income. If that rate is 25 percent or
higher, the dividends are taxed at 15 percent. If that rate is below 25 percent, the
dividends are taxed at 5 percent.
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If a shareholder receives a corporate dividend in 2008, the 61-day
minimum holding still applies to determine whether the dividend will comprise
part of the shareholder’s ordinary income or if it will be taxed as a long term
capital gain. In addition, the tax imposed in the latter situation will still vary
depending on the marginal tax rate that applies to the shareholder’s ordinary
income. The only difference is that the rates will change. The tax will be 15
percent if the shareholder’s ordinary income is subject to tax at the marginal rate
of 25 percent or higher. However, the dividend will be exempt from tax if the
shareholder’s ordinary income is subject to tax at a marginal rate below 25
percent. The following table summarizes by year how dividends are taxed to
individual shareholders.35
Tax on Corporate Dividends
Received by Individuals
Minimum
Holding
Period
Met
Yes

Year Dividend Received
Before
2001
N/A
Ordinary
Income:
15%
28%
31%
36%
39.6%

No

2001

2002

N/A
N/A
Ordinary Ordinary
Income: Income:
10%
10%
15%
15%
27.5%
27%
30.5%
30%
35.5%
35%
39.5%
38.6%

2003 –
2007
15% or
5%
Ordinary
Income:
10%
15%
25%
28%
33%
35%

2008
15% or
0%
Ordinary
Income:
10%
15%
25%
28%
33%
35%

2009 –
2010

After
2010

N/A
Ordinary
Income:
10%
15%
25%
28%
33%
35%

N/A
Ordinary
Income:
15%
28%
31%
36%
39.6%

Although the rules subject the profits of a business to tax at the corporate
level and also at the shareholder level, there are many situations in which only
one of the two taxes will apply. For instance, the shareholders will not have to
pay tax on any profits that are not actually paid to them as dividends. In such a
case only the corporation will be subject to tax on the earnings. Alternatively,
only a shareholder will be taxable on amounts paid to him as reasonable
compensation for services rendered to the firm. The corporation will pay no tax
on these amounts because they are a deductible item that reduces the
corporation’s taxable income.
Because shareholders of (primarily closely held) corporations have an
incentive to employ such strategies to avoid tax, there are rules designed to
either penalize or outlaw such behavior. A practice of not paying dividends to
35
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shareholders could trigger the accumulated earnings tax. The Internal Revenue
Service is authorized to assess this penalty tax when it determines that the
corporation has accumulated profits beyond the reasonable needs of the
business.36 The tax is generally computed at a rate that corresponds to the rate
that would apply to any dividends paid to a shareholder. Thus, the current rate
is 15 percent.37
Aside from the accumulated earnings penalty tax, the personal holding
company tax would apply if two conditions are met. First at least 60 percent of
the corporation’s gross income must come from certain passive sources, like
interest and dividends.38 Second, five or fewer individuals must own over half
of the stock in the corporation.39 If these two conditions are met in any given
year, a penalty tax is imposed on virtually all taxable income of the corporation
from that year, other than amounts distributed to shareholders as a dividend.40
Unlike the accumulated earnings tax, the personal holding company tax applies
in a mechanical fashion. It cannot be avoided by showing the absence of an
intention to evade tax.41
Like the accumulated earnings tax, the penalty is computed at a rate that
generally corresponds to the rate that would apply to dividends paid to a
shareholder. Thus, the current penalty rate is 15 percent. After 2008, when the
temporary tax cut on dividends expires, the rate will be adjusted to reflect the
highest marginal tax rate that applies to individuals. That rate currently stands
at 35 percent, but it is due to revert to 39.6 percent after 2010.
In cases where the corporation uses its profits to pay a shareholder
compensation for services rendered to the business, there is only one restriction
on the firm’s ability to do so: the amount must be reasonable.42 No bright line
rule applies to determine whether a salary is reasonable. Instead, the courts use
a variety of tests. Furthermore, in the event the corporation claims a deduction
for compensation that is not reasonable, the corporation will still benefit from
that deduction unless it is adjusted after being challenged by the Internal
Revenue Service. Because unreasonable compensation is difficult to detect,
many such overstated deductions go unchallenged.
2.

Taxation of the Income of an S Corporation
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Federal tax law permits any corporation that satisfies certain eligibility
requirements to elect to be treated as a small business corporation for federal tax
purposes.43 As a result, the corporation would be subject to the rules of
subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. Under subchapter S, the corporation
does not pay any corporate tax on the income of the business.44 Instead, the
business profits are taken into account by each shareholder to determine their
individual income tax liabilities.45 The amount that any shareholder takes into
account is referred to as the shareholder’s pro rata share and reflects his
percentage interest in the corporation.46 Thus, an individual who owns half the
stock in an S corporation in any given year is taxable on half of any income (or
loss) generated by the corporation in that year.
The actual tax that an S corporation shareholder pays on any income
allocated to him will depend on the source of the income.47 Thus, any item of
income that the corporation derives from a tax exempt source will be tax exempt
to the shareholder. Similarly, any item of income that the corporation derives
from the sale of a capital asset that the corporation held for over a year will be
taxed at the rate that applies to long term capital gains.48 Meanwhile, any item of
income that the corporation derives from a source other than one that is subject
to a special rate of tax is treated as ordinary income, making it subject to tax at
the marginal rates that apply to all of the shareholder’s ordinary income.49 An S
corporation is commonly referred to as a flow-through entity precisely because
any income generated by the corporation retains its character when allocated to
the shareholders as pro rata shares. Moreover, this income is taxed to the
shareholders in the year earned by the corporation, not the year received from
the corporation.
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A shareholder in an S corporation is taxable on amounts he actually
receives from the corporation depending on the reason for the payment. To the
extent the payment is a distribution of the business profits previously allocated
to the shareholder, the payment will not be taxable to him.50 (The tax was
already imposed when the corporation allocated its income to the shareholder as
a pro rata share.) However, if the shareholder receives a payment that
constitutes compensation for services rendered to the corporation, the payment
will be taxable as income to him, just as compensation from any other source
would.51 Such compensation will also be a deductible expense to the
corporation, provided the amount is reasonable for the services rendered.52 Like
any other deductible expense, the payment will reduce the amount of business
profits that are left to be allocated to the shareholders as taxable pro rata shares.53
The net effect is that the income tax of a shareholder in an S corporation is based
partly on amounts that the corporation pays to him as compensation, and partly
on the profits (net of compensation expense) the corporation allocates to him as a
pro rata share.
3.

Taxation of the Income of a Partnership or Multi-Member
Limited Liability Company

Subchapter K contains the default rules that determine the extent to which
the profits of a business are taxed when the business is conducted as a
partnership or limited liability company that has more than one member. As
discussed above, both such business entities are treated as a partnership for
federal income tax purposes.54 As a general rule, the profits of a business
conducted are not taxed at the partnership level.55 Instead, the partners are taxed
on their respective shares of the taxable profits of the business.56 In any given tax
year, a partner will be allocated a share of the partnership’s business profits and
other items.57 Such an allocation is referred to as the partner’s distributive
share.58 To the extent a partnership has made an allocation of profits to a
partner, the partner will not pay tax on those profits when he actually receives
them in the form of a distribution from the partnership.59 Thus, if a 50-50
50
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partnership makes $100,000 in taxable income in one year, each partner will be
allocated and taxable on $50,000. However, neither partner will be subject to tax
when they actually receive a distribution of that money from the partnership.
Like an S corporation, a partnership derives its flow-through qualities
from the fact that only the partners, not the business, are taxable on the profits of
the business.60 In addition, a partner’s actual tax liability will depend in part on
the source of any income item allocated to him.61 Thus, if the partnership derives
income from a tax exempt source, the partners will pay no tax on their respective
allocations of that item. Similarly, any item of income that the partnership
derives from the sale of a capital asset that the partnership held for over a year
will be taxable to the partner at the rate that applies to long term capital gains.62
Meanwhile, any item of income that the partnership derives from a source other
than one that is subject to a special rate of tax is treated as ordinary income,
making it subject to tax at the marginal rates that apply to all of the partner’s
ordinary income.63
A partner is taxable on amounts he actually receives from a partnership
depending on the reason for the payment. To the extent the payment is a
distribution of the business profits previously allocated to the partner, the
payment will not be taxable to the partner.64 (The tax was already imposed when
the partnership allocated its income to the partner as a distributive share.)
However, if the partner receives a payment that constitutes compensation for
services rendered to the partnership, the payment will be taxable as income to
the partner, just as compensation from any other source would.65 Referred to as
a form of “guaranteed payment”, such compensation paid to a partner will also
be a deductible expense to the partnership, provided it is reasonable for the
services rendered.66 Like any other deductible expense, the payment will reduce
the amount of business profits that are allocated to the partners as taxable
distributive shares.67 The net effect is that the income tax of a partner will be
based partly on amounts that the partnership pays to him as a guaranteed
payment of compensation, and partly on the profits (net of compensation
expense) the partnerships allocates to him as a distributive share.
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Although the rules that apply to partnerships and S corporations are
similar in many ways, the partnership rules generally allow for more flexibility.
First, there are several restrictions on the number and the type of shareholders
that a corporation can have in order to be eligible to convert to (and remain) an S
corporation.68 These restrictions stand in contrast to the absence of any
limitations on the types and number of investors that can be partners in a
partnership. In addition, in an S corporation, all items of income, loss and
deduction and credit must be allocated among the shareholders each year pro
rata, based on the number of shares they own and the length of time they owned
the shares.69 By contrast, in a partnership, virtually any allocation that the
partners choose will be respected as long as the allocation tracks the economic
relationship between the partners.70 This generally means that the allocations of
partnership income and other items control what the individual partners are
entitled to receive in the form of actual payouts.71 Moreover, because an S
corporation can only have one class of stock, it cannot single out any individual
shareholder for the payment of dividends.72 Rather, any distribution of business
profits must be shared by all shareholders on the basis of the number of shares
owned. By contrast, if a partnership wants to make a distribution to just one
partner, it can do so. Similarly, if it wants to make a distribution to several
partners, there is no requirement that the distribution be allocated among its
recipients in any particular way.
B.

Federal Taxes on an Employee-Owner’s Income from Labor

There are two sets of federal employment tax statutes that may apply to
an individual who works for a business he also owns. The first is the Federal
Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”), which imposes a tax that is commonly
referred to as the social security tax. The second is the Self-Employment
Contribution Act (“SECA”), which imposes a tax that is often referred to as the
self-employment tax. The amounts collected under both acts are earmarked for
funding social security and Medicare benefits.73 The two acts are mutually
exclusive so that only one set of rules will ever apply to any given dollar of
earnings. Thus, when the FICA rules apply, the SECA rules will not, and vice
versa.
The statutes are intended to impose a tax on income from labor, as
opposed to any returns on capital. As a result, each statute attempts to define the
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See footnote 43.
I.R.C. §§ 1366(a), 1377(a)(1).
70 I.R.C. § 704(b).
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b).
72 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D).
73 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2005).
69

13

Working for Free
tax base in a way that isolates such labor income.74 However, because it can be
difficult to distinguish such income from what an employee-owner receives as a
return on capital, the line that separates the two can often appear arbitrary.75
1.

FICA

The tax imposed by FICA has two components. The first is the old-age,
survivors, and disability insurance component, often referred to as OASDI. It is
a 12.4 percent levy on amounts that constitute “wages from employment.”76 One
half of the tax is deducted from the employee’s compensation.77 The employer
pays the other half.78 This component of the FICA tax is earmarked to cover
social security benefits. There is a limit on the amount of wages that can be
taxed.79 Referred to as the contribution and benefit base, this limit is $94,200 for
2006.80 Thus, any wages from employment beyond that limit are exempt from
the FICA-OASDI tax. The contribution and benefit base is adjusted each year to
reflect increases in average wages of the U.S. economy.81
The second component of the FICA tax is the hospital insurance
component. It is a 2.9 percent levy on an individual’s “wages from
employment.” As with the OASDI component, one half of this tax is deducted
from the employee’s compensation, while the employer pays the other half.
However, unlike the OASDI component, there is no limit on the amount of
wages from employment that is subject to the tax. Thus, the hospital insurance
tax applies to all amounts that qualify as wages from employment, even amounts
that exceed the OASDI contribution and benefit base. The hospital insurance
component of the FICA tax is earmarked to cover Medicare benefits.
The FICA tax will apply to a self-employed individual only when he
operates the business through either a C corporation or an S corporation. In
those instances, only amounts that the corporation pays to the employee-owner
as remuneration for employment count as wages from employment.82 Thus, only
those amounts are subject to the FICA tax. The individual’s share of any other
profits of the business simply is not subject to the FICA tax, even if it could be
considered the product of the employee-ow
ner’s labor. As a result, earnings that
the corporation retains are not subject to the FICA tax. Nor are amounts paid to
74

Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper – Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax,
54 Tax Law. 65 (2000).
75 Lester B. Snyder, Taxation with An Attitude: Can We Rationalize the Distinction
Between “Earned” and “Unearned” Income?, 18 Va. Tax Rev. 241 (1998).
76 I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a).
77 I.R.C. § 3102(a).
78 I.R.C. § 3111(a).
79 I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1).
80 Notice 2005-85, 2005-46 I.R.B. 961.
81 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2005).
82 I.R.C. § 3121(a).
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an employee-shareholder as a dividend. By defining the tax base in this way,
FICA presents the opportunity for individuals to manage or control their
employment tax liability when they own and control a business conducted
through an S corporation or a C corporation. In such cases, the individual can
determine whether compensation is paid, when it gets paid, and how much is
paid. By exercising this power, the individual necessarily controls whether he
must pay the FICA tax, when he must pay the FICA tax, and how much tax he
must pay.
A limited liability company that is treated as a corporation enjoys
additional tax planning opportunities. Because shares in a state law corporation
belong to designated classes, all owners of shares in a given class must share in
any distribution paid to one class member; the corporation cannot single out an
individual shareholder to receive a dividend distribution. No such restriction
applies to a limited liability company. Thus, the company is entirely free to
single out one of its members for a distribution. Similarly, the company could
make a distribution to several members and not be obligated to allocate the
payment in any particular way. This flexibility presents the opportunity for an
employee-member to receive a distribution as disguised compensation for
services rendered to company, potentially avoiding the member’s employment
tax liability.
2.

SECA

The SECA tax operates as the FICA tax counterpart for self-employed
individuals. Accordingly, like the FICA tax, the SECA tax has two components.
The first component is a 12.4 percent tax earmarked to finance social security
benefits. Its counterpart is the OASDI component of the FICA tax. The second
component is a 2.9 percent tax earmarked to fund the Medicare insurance
program.83
The contribution and benefit base that applies to the OASDI component of
the FICA tax also applies to the OASDI component of the SECA tax. Thus, the
OASDI tax applies to no more than $94,200 in 2006. The SECA and FICA statutes
are designed so that the OASDI component of the taxes will never apply to more
than the FICA contribution and benefit base in effect for any year.84 Thus, if an
individual has $100,000 of wages from employment in 2006, the FICA-OASDI tax
would apply to the first $94,200, leaving no portion of any self-employment
income to be taxed under SECA. Conversely, if an individual has no wages from
employment in 2006, there would be nothing to tax under FICA, while the SECAOASDI tax would apply to up to $94,200 of any income the individual may have
from self-employment. If, however, an individual has $40,000 of wages from
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I.R.C. § 1401(b).
See I.R.C. § 1402(b).
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employment in 2006, the entire amount would be subject to the FICA-OASDI tax,
while up to $54,200 of self-employment income would be subject to the SECAOASDI tax, resulting in a tax on no more than the $94,200 contribution and
benefit base in effect for the year. By operating in this way, the rules ensure that
anyone whose income includes both wages from employment and income from
self-employment will never be at a disadvantage to someone who has income
does not have income from both sources. 85
Both components of the SECA tax apply to an individual’s “income from
self-employment.” 86 The term does not include any amounts that are subject to
the FICA tax.87 In addition, in order to count as income from self employment,
an item must qualify as net earnings from self-employment (“NESE”). 88 What
counts as NESE for a self-employed individual will depend on the kind of legal
entity used to conduct the business enterprise. It will also depend on the kind of
ownership interest the individual may have in the business. However, in no
event will the SECA tax ever apply to amounts generated by a self-employed
individual who conducts his business through either a C corporation or an S
corporation. In those cases, the payments they receive as compensation will be
subject to the FICA tax.89 Any dividends received by a shareholder in a C
corporation are expressly excluded from the reach of the SECA tax.90
Furthermore, SECA has no provision that would count as part of the tax base an
individual’s the pro rata share from an S corporation.
Because the S corporation is a flow-through entity, one would expect that
the SECA rules would control to determine the employment tax liability of any
shareholder, just as they do to the owner of all other flow through business
entities. The fact that it does not is largely a relic of a bygone era. When the selfemployment tax was enacted, the S corporation did not exist, so the tax base
could not be defined by reference to amounts earned through such a business.
Furthermore, when subchapter S was adopted, a shareholder’s pro rata share
85

The fact that the OASDI component of the employment tax does not apply to amounts
in excess of the annually contribution and benefit base distinguishes it from the generally
progressive way in which the federal income tax operates. The income tax applies only to the
extent an individual has income that exceeds certain amounts that are either excluded, exempt, or
deducted from gross income. I.R.C. § 63. The two federal employment taxes have been widely
criticized for being regressive. E.g., Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal
Income and Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (2002).
86 I.R.C. § 1401(a), (b).
87 I.R.C. § 1402(b)(1).
88 I.R.C. § 1402(b).
89 See discussion accompanying note 82. See also I.R.C. § 1402(c)(2).
90 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2). The Internal Revenue Service has had limited success convincing
courts to treat dividends as disguised remuneration for services rendered, causing such amounts
to be subject to the FICA tax. E.g., Nu-Look Design, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2004);
Radtke v. U.S., 712 F.Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis. 1989); Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. U.S., 918 F.2d 90 (9th
Cir. 1990). See also Burgess J.W. Raby and William L. Raby, Shareholder Compensation: How
Low Can You Go?, Tax Notes Today, June 13, 1996, 96 TNT 116-62.
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was treated as a dividend.91 The SECA statute expressly states that net earnings
from self employment do not include dividends.92 However, subchapter S was
later revised to modify the tax character of an S corporation’s pro rata share.
Today, a pro rata share is no longer regarded as a dividend. Instead, the
individual items of S corporation taxable income flow through to the
shareholders, retaining their character in the hands of the shareholder.93 Even
though this made a shareholder’s pro rata share virtually identical to a partner’s
distributive share, Congress never updated the self-employment statute establish
parity in the way the law applies to the two situations. Thus, today the statute
does not define net earnings from self-employment to include an S corporation
shareholder’s pro rata share, while it does expressly include a partner’s
distributive share of partnership income as such.94 Clearly, Congress could
update the law if it could. It has been suggested that Congress has not done so
partly because it views the separate existence of the S corporation as a sufficient
basis for treating pro rata share allocations as investment income, not income
from labor.95
a. Partner in a Partnership
The employment tax base of a partner in a partnership depends on
whether the partner is a general partner or a limited partner. If a partner is a
general partner, the self employment tax will apply to the partner’s distributive
share allocation of partnership income.96 The tax will also apply to any
guaranteed payment the partner receives, whether for the use of capital or for the
performance of services.97 For a limited partner, the self employment tax applies
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I.R.C. § 1373(b) (1959).
I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2). In addition, the Internal Revenue Service concluded that such an
item did not count as part of the shareholder’s net earnings from self-employment. Rev. Rul. 59221, 1959-1 C.B. 225.
93 I.R.C. § 1366(b), as amended by Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, P.L. No. 97354, 96
Stat. 1669 (1982).
94 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
95 Fritz, supra note 3 at 825.
96 I.R.C. § 1402(a). Certain adjustments are made to the partner’s distributive share to
determine the amount that is subject to the self-employment tax. The adjustments generally
prevent the tax from applying to certain passive items of income that do not represent income
from labor. Thus, in computing the self-employment income of a partner, the distributive share
is adjusted to exclude, among other things, interest and dividends, and gains and losses from the
sale of capital assets. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2), (3).
97 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-1(b). The regulation predates a 1977 amendment that redefined
what counts as self-employment income to a partner. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13), added by the Social
Security Amendments of 1977, P.L. 95-216, § 313(b). (This paragraph was originally added as
paragraph 12. However, P.L. 98-21, § 124(c)(2) redesignated paragraph 12 as paragraph 13.) The
change only affected what counts as self-employment income to a limited partner. The legislative
history does not elaborate on the intended scope of the change. See H.R. Rep. No. 8-702, 95th
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only to the guaranteed payments received for the performance of services.98 It
does not apply to their distributive share of income of the partnership.99 If a
partner owns both a general partnership interest and a limited partnership
interest, the self-employment tax applies to that portion of the partner’s
distributive share associated with the general partnership interest only.100
There are no provisions in the self-employment tax statute or regulations
that specify what distinguishes a limited partner from a general partner for
purposes of the statute.101 This stands in contrast to standard articulated in the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act. Under those rules, a limited partner is not
liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership, while a general partner is.
Moreover, a limited partner risks loosing the protection of the limited liability if
he participates in the control of the partnership.102 Thus, under current law, a
partner’s exposure for the self-employment tax is purely a matter of the nature of
the interest the partner owns in the partnership.
One might expect that amounts received by a partner in exchange for the
performance of services would count as wages from employment for FICA
purposes. However, the legislative history indicates that Congress expected that
it would not be appropriate to treat the partnership as a separate taxpaying
entity (as opposed to an extension of the partner) in certain situations.103 In
addition, the Internal Revenue Service long ago concluded that it is
inappropriate to treat a partnership as an employer of one of its members.104 As
a result, payments that are considered to be made by the partnership to a partner
who is not acting in his capacity as a partner will not count as wages that are
subject to the FICA tax. Instead, the amounts are treated as self-employment
income to the partner.105

Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1977). Thus, it appears that general partners remain subject to employment
tax on guaranteed payments received both for services performed and for the use of capital.
98 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).
99 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).
100 Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h).
101 However, there are proposed regulations which would consider the degree to which a
limited partner participates in the operations of the partnership. Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2).
Congress acted in 1997 to prohibit the Internal Revenue Service from finalizing these regulations.
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, P.L. 105-34, § 935.
102 Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 303(a).
103 The 1954 Conference Report includes the following language:
[Section 707(a) provides] for the use of the “entity” approach in the treatment of the
transactions between a partner and a partnership . . . . No inference is intended,
however, that a partnership is to be considered a separate entity for the purpose of
applying other provisions of the internal revenue laws if the concept of the partnership
as a collection of individuals is more appropriate for such provisions.
H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1954).
104 Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256.
105 Id.

18

Working for Free
b. Member of a Multi-Member Limited Liability
Company

Because a multi-member limited liability company is treated as a
partnership for federal income tax purposes (absent an election to be treated as a
corporation), any member is treated as a partner in a partnership for purposes of
the self-employment tax. However, applying the partnership rules to a limited
liability company does not produce any clear answers.
A limited liability company has only one category of member, while the
partners in a partnership can participate as either a general or a limited partner,
depending on the level of liability protection the owner desires and the extent to
which they intend to participate in the business of the partnership. In a limited
liability company, each member enjoys the same level of protection from liability
for the debts and obligations of the business; it is limited to the member’s
investment in the company.106 In addition, a member does not jeopardize the
limit on liability by participating in the business of the company.107
SECA applies a different set of rules depending on whether the individual
is either a general or a limited partner in the partnership. However, a limited
liability company draws no such distinction between its members. One could
assert a reasoned basis for applying either rule. For example, it would seem
appropriate to treat a member as equivalent to a general partner since all
members are in a position to participate in the operations of the company.108 On
the other hand, one could argue that the limited partnership rules should apply
on the grounds that that a member enjoys limited liability from the debts and
obligations of the business, the hallmark of a limited partner’s status as such.109
Understandably, the absence of a clear rule has been an invitation for
some to take the position that a member must comply with the rules that apply
to limited partners when doing so works to their advantage.110 Taking that
position minimizes the member’s employment tax liability because the member’s
net earnings from self-employment would consist solely of amounts received
from the company in exchange for services the member performed for the
company; no part of the member’s allocation of business profits would be
included in the employment tax base.
c. Sole Proprietor
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Uniform Limited Liability Company Act [hereinafter “ULLCA”] (1996) §§ 303, 402(a).
ULLCA (1996) § 303(a).
108 ULLCA (1996) § 301(a), (c).
109 See ULLCA (1996) § 303.
110 See, e.g., Burgess J.W. Raby and William L. Raby, New Incentive for Avoiding SE and
FICA Tax, Tax Notes Today, December 10, 1998, 98 TNT 237-58.
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If a single individual does not create or organize a formal entity through
which to conduct a business, that individual is considered to be operating the
business as a sole proprietor, a status that does not give rise to a separate legal
entity. Thus, the assets of the business are considered to be owned by the
individual sole proprietor. In addition, that individual is liable for the debts and
obligations of the business.111
For purposes of the income tax, a sole proprietor is disregarded as a
separate taxpaying entity.112 Thus, the business, as such, does not pay income
tax on the profits generated by its activities. Instead, any profits from the
business are included in the gross income of the owner.113 Thus, the owner pays
tax on the business profits at the rates that apply to the owner.114
Aside from having to pay income tax on the business profits, a sole
proprietor also will have to pay self-employment tax on those business profits.115
Thus, as a general rule, any amounts that will be taxed to the owner for income
tax purposes will also be taxed to the owner for employment tax purposes.
However, business losses are treated differently under the income and
employment taxes. Under the income tax, the sole proprietor can utilize the loss
to offset taxable income from other sources, both in the year of the loss and in
other tax years.116 Thus, for example, if the business loses $10,000 in its first year
of operation, and if the owner has income from other sources in that year, the
loss will offset $10,000 of income from those other sources, triggering a reduction
in the owner’s income tax liability. However, if the owner has no income from
other sources or if the income from those other sources is less than what he lost
from the business, the owner can utilize that loss to offset taxable income in other
years. The loss is generally utilized in the prior two tax years and the succeeding
twenty tax years.117 A special rule permits the individual to waive the use of a
loss to offset income in prior years.118 By permitting the owner to utilize a loss to
offset income in years other than the one in which the loss arose, the income tax
rules essentially represent an exception to the general requirement that
individuals must compute their income tax liability on the basis of the activities
and events that occur within specific annual accounting period.
111

For a discussion of the sole proprietorship, see Larry E. Ribstein, Unincorporated
Business Entities (3d ed.) chapter 2.01.
112 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(i). The mechanism for doing so is the Schedule C, which
the owner must complete and include when filing her annual tax return.
113 I.R.C. § 61(a)(3).
114 Individuals are taxed under a graduated rate structure whose rates range from 10% to
35%. I.R.C. § 1(a) through (d); Rev. Proc. 2003-85. The 10% bracket will expire after 2008, leaving
the lowest bracket of income to be taxed at 15%. The tax applies to amounts that exceed any
exemptions, exclusions and deductions that are allowed to the individual. I.R.C. § 63.
115 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
116 I.R.C. § 172(a).
117 I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A).
118 I.R.C. § 172(b)(3).
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By contrast, the employment tax rules generally do not permit a business
loss to reduce the amounts subject to employment tax. Thus, if a sole proprietor
has wages from employment in a year that he also sustained a $10,000 loss from
the business, the business loss will not offset any portion of the wages, which
will be subject to the FICA tax to the extent they do not exceed the contribution
and benefit base. However, if an individual has several businesses that are each
operated as a sole proprietorship, a loss sustained by one business will be taken
into account to determine the individual’s net earnings from self-employment for
that year.119 However, if the loss from one business exceeds the profits from all
the other businesses, the net loss still is not available to offset taxable amounts in
other years. In this way, the employment tax rules treat multiple businesses as
one enterprise, while continuing to base the individual’s employment tax liability
solely on the activities and events that occur during a particular annual
accounting period.
C.

Commentary on the Employment Tax Scheme

The existing federal employment tax statutory scheme is defective in
several respects. First, it lacks a clear rule that applies to a member of any
limited liability company that has not elected to be treated as a corporation for
federal income tax purposes. The gap in the law gives rise to tax planning
opportunities that can produce several undesirable outcomes. First, it increases
the role that tax considerations play in the selection of an entity for conducting a
business enterprise. Ideally, the choice of a business entity should not be
influenced by tax considerations. Second, it creates the very real potential that
individuals who may be identical situations will interpret the law differently,
leading to different computations of their employment tax liability. In an ideal
world, individuals in substantially similar situations should pay the same tax.
Third, the government is likely to collect less than what it is due in tax, leading to
underfunding of the Social Security and Medicare programs at a time when their
long term financial solvency is in question. Fourth, the absence of clarity can
increase how much it costs taxpayers to comply with the law. At one extreme,
taxpayers who are willing and able to obtain competent tax advice will do so
when such an expense can be avoided if the law merely enunciated a clear rule.
Finally, the mere existence of a tax planning opportunity runs the risk of
undermining respect for a tax system that relies on voluntary compliance,
increasing the need for the government to fund enforcement activities.
Another defect in the existing statutory scheme is that the tax liability of a
partner in a partnership depends on whether the partner owns a general or
limited partnership interest. The use of two separate rules dates back to a time
when there was a substantive difference between the two classes of partners.
119
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The self-employment tax rules initially required all partners (whether limited or
general) to be taxed on their distributive share of income.120 At the time, a
limited partner had to be a passive investor in the partnership, or risk loosing the
protection of limited liability. Congress later determined that it was
inappropriate to treat as earnings from work amounts allocated to a limited
partner who did not (and could not) play an active role in the business.121 As a
result, Congress changed the law so that the self employment tax of a limited
partner would only be based on amounts the partner received in exchange for
rendering services to the business.122 Over the course of time, however, state law
has evolved to permit individuals to play active roles in an unincorporated
business without loosing the protection of limited liability.123 As a result, it no
longer makes sense for the self-employment tax to be based on the mere
designation of a partner as a general or limited one.
Continued use of an outdated rule can cause individuals who are in
otherwise similar situations to pay a different tax. Taxpayers can loose respect
for the tax system when it produces such inconsistent outcomes. In addition, the
continued reliance on an immaterial factor in the computation of tax liability can
represent an undesirable tax planning opportunity that, because of its very
existence, can further undermine the respect taxpayers have for the system.
When taxpayers loose respect for the system, compliance rates are likely to suffer
and income is likely to go underreported with greater frequency, making it
necessary to commit more government funds in enforcement activities to reverse
the trend.
A third defect is that different rules apply to determine the employment
tax base of an employee-owner of a business depending on the business entity
that is used to conduct the enterprise. Under current law, the SECA rules apply
to sole proprietors and to any individual with an interest in a partnership or
other unincorporated business entity that has not elected to be treated as a
corporation for federal income tax purposes. Under those rules, the employment
tax base can consist of the employee-owner’s entire share of the profits of the
business, in addition to any compensation the individual receives for services
rendered. By contrast, the FICA rules apply to any individual who owns an
interest in any state law corporation or any unincorporated business entity that
has elected to be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. Under
those rules, the tax base consists solely of amounts the employee-shareholder
receives as compensation for services rendered. An individual’s liability for
employment tax should not depend on mere formalities.

120
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Federal employment taxes are intended to apply to income from labor.
When an individual works for a business he also owns and control, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to determine the extent to which the profits of the business are
the result of the employee-owner’s labor or a return on any capital that may be
invested in the business. Wherever the line may fall, it seems unlikely to depend
on the legal formalities that matter under the current statutory scheme.
Moreover, whatever standard is used to draw the distinction, it should apply to
all individuals who work for a business they also own and control. It should not
matter whether the business operates through a corporation, partnership, limited
liability company, sole proprietorship or some other vehicle yet to be created.
III.

Recent Proposal for Reform
A.

Proposal of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation

The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (the “JCT Staff”) has
advanced a proposal that goes a part of the way toward addressing these three
defects.124 The JCT Staff proposal would extend to any owner of a flow through
business entity the current set of rules that apply to general partners under the
self-employment tax. Thus, all such owners would generally have to pay selfemployment tax on the profits of the business allocated to them, even if such
income is not actually paid out to them. These owners would also be taxable on
any compensation received for services rendered to the business. However, if
the owner does not materially participate in the business, only the owner’s
reasonable compensation from the entity is treated as subject to SECA tax. This
approach would apply to any owner in a business other than a sole proprietor
and a shareholder in a taxable corporation.
The JCT Staff proposal retains the current limitation on the kinds of profits
that are taxable to an owner under the self-employment tax. Thus, certain types
of passive income like dividends and interest, certain gains, and other items that
do not seem to qualify as income from labor would not be subject to tax.
However, the proposal carves out an exception when the entity is in a service
trade or business. In such situations, all of the profits allocated to an owner are
treated as net earnings from self-employment.125
In his testimony at a May 5, 2005 Congressional hearing on Social
Security, George K. Yin, Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
explained the rationale for the rule.
124 Joint Committee on Taxation, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax
Expenditures 99-104 (Jan. 27, 2005) JCS-02
- 05.
125 A service business is defined to be one whose activities involve the performance of
services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science,
performing arts, or consulting. This definition is similar to the one that appears in Code section
448(d)(2).
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“The conceptual premise of the proposal is that the base for FICA and
SECA taxes is labor income. The proposal applies this notion more
uniformly than does present law to individuals who perform services for
or on behalf of a pass-through entity in which they own an interest (i.e., a
partnership, limited liability company, or S corporation). The proposal
treats such individuals similarly to sole proprietors, as well as similarly to
each other. Not only does this more uniform treatment improve the
fairness of the tax law and increase the internal consistency of the tax
rules, it also tends to improve tax neutrality by reducing the importance of
FICA and SECA tax differences in taxpayers’ choice of business entity.”126
The JCT Staff proposal appears to adequately address the three principal
defects in federal employment tax law in the following ways. First, the proposal
eliminates the uncertainty over how a member of a limited liability company
should determine his employment tax liability. Second, it disregards a partner’s
status as a general or limited partner as a factor in the computation of the
partner’s employment tax liability, substituting a rule that considers the degree
to which the partner participates in the business of the partnership. Third, the
proposal enunciates a uniform procedure for computing the employment tax
liability of any individual who owns an interest in any nontaxable business
entity. Thus, under the proposal, the provisions of SECA would apply to
determine the employment tax liability of anyone who owns an interest in an S
corporation or any unincorporated entity that has not elected to be treated as a
corporation for federal income tax purposes.
The JCT Staff proposal has been widely endorsed by the practicing bar for
establishing a clear and uniform rule that applies to any employee-owner of a
flow through entity.127 In addition, although there are many different views on
how best to distinguish an employee-owner’s labor incomefrom any return on
capital invested in business, the organizations and individuals who have voiced
their reaction to the proposal seem to believe that it strikes an appropriate
balance between the interest in basing the tax on a precise measure of labor
income, and the interest in using a rule that taxpayers can understand and apply
with relative ease.128
B.

Commentary on the JCT Staff Proposal

126 George K. Yin, Testimony at a Hearing of the Senate Committee on Finance on “Social
Security: Achieving Sustainable Solvency,” May 25, 2005 (JCX-38-05).
127 E.g., New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Comments on JCT Recommendation
Relating to Employment and Self-Employment Taxes of Partners, LLC Members and S
Corporation Shareholders (Sept. 23, 2005) reprinted in Tax Notes (Oct. 31, 2005) at 675.
128 Id.
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The JCT Staff proposal does indeed represent an improvement over the
current state of affairs. Among other things, by imposing the employment tax on
amounts that a business makes for an employee-owner, not merely what the
business pays to that person as compensation, the proposal severely reduces the
opportunity for the understatement of labor income, and the underpayment of
employment tax, by such individuals. However, because the rules do not apply
to employee-shareholders of taxable corporations, the proposal falls short of
establishing parity in the way federal employment tax rules apply to all
individuals who conduct a business through a business entity.
The problems associated with this inconsistency are most apparent in the
case of individual who plays a controlling role in the business that employs him.
Such a businessmay generate profits that represent solely the product of the
employee-owner’s labor. However, under the JCT Staff proposal, if the business
is conducted through a partnership, an employment tax would apply to the
employee-partner’s entire distributive share of the profits for the year, plus any
salary. Meanwhile, if the business is conducted through a corporation, an
employment tax would only apply to amounts actually paid to an employeeshareholder as compensation. That amount maybe less than the individual’s
share of the business profits in any given year. In fact, it may be zero.
Indeed, in the setting of a corporation that is controlled by an employeeshareholder, that owner has an economic incentive to deal with the business in
ways that minimize the total tax that both he and the corporation must pay.
There is no reason this consideration would not play a role when the employeeshareholder wants to access the profits of the business and needs to decide how
to do so. There could be many aspects to this decision, including whether the
payout should take the form of compensation or a dividend, the amount of the
payout and when it should occur.
Before the temporary dividend tax cut, the ability of a controlling
employee-shareholder to exploit this flexibility had limited practical significance
for employment tax purposes. In almost all cases, the combined tax liability of
the corporation and the individual would be kept to a minimum if a payout were
structured as compensation. Thus, there was almost no risk that a corporation
would pay a dividend as a form of disguised compensation, potentially
shortchanging the social security and Medicare trust funds. The primary
advantage in the corporate setting was that a controlling employee-shareholder
could decide whether to access the profits of the business at all. If he did not,
none of the taxes associated with the transfer of money between him and the
corporation would apply.
Ever since the temporary tax cut on dividends took effect, however, the
math has changed. Now, if a controlling employee-shareholder wants to access
the earnings of the corporation, that individual frequently has an incentive to do
so by causing the corporation to pay him a dividend. To the extent the dividend
is disguised compensation, the transaction avoids an employment tax that would
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otherwise apply to generate funds for social security and Medicare benefits at a
time when the long term financial stability of those programs is at risk.
The following discussion illustrates the extent to which an incentive now
exists for corporations to pay dividends as disguised compensation to controlling
shareholders who work for the business. Among other things, the discussion
shows that the dividend tax cut does not change the incentives in all cases
involving closely held corporations. Rather, high income individuals who own
and control low income corporations are the ones positioned to make the most of
what appears to be an unintended tax saving opportunity created by the
temporary dividend tax cut.
IV.

Financial Incentives to Minimize Federal Employment Tax

In order to illustrate the extent to which tax considerations can affect the
form in which corporate profits are paid out to controlling employeeshareholders, this analysis considers the simplified case of a corporation that has
only one shareholder. That individual also works for the company and desires to
access $15,000 of the corporation’s earnings. He faces the choice of structuring
the payout as a year-end bonus or as a dividend. 129 For purpose of the analysis,
it is assumed the employee-shareholder is a married individual who files a joint
tax return with his spouse. In addition, the analysis assumes that the business
made no less than $50,000 (before paying any compensation to the employeeowner) in the year of the payout.130 Finally, the analysis assumes that any bonus
paid by the corporation will be the employee-shareholder’s only source of
income subject to employment tax.
The analysis does not take into account any alternative minimum tax
liability that may apply to the employee-owner or to the corporation.131 In
addition, although the phase out of deductions can affect the marginal rate that
applies to the income of an individual, such phase outs are not taken into
account.132
129 A shareholder can also receive a distribution in the form of a loan. Because a loan
must be repaid, it is materially different from both a dividend and compensation. As a result,
this analysis does not consider the tax consequences of a loan.
130 As previously discussed, a corporation is taxed at 15 percent on taxable income up to
$50,000. See discussion accompanying note 21 et seq. As that discussion points out, the marginal
rate could go as high as 39 percent when taxable income falls between $100,000 and $335,000. By
not assuming any ceiling on the corporation’s earnings, the analysis leaves open the possibility
that the corporation would fall anywhere within the full range of marginal tax rates that applies
to corporations.
131 A corporation subject to the alternative minimum tax would generally be taxed at a
flat 20 percent on an adjusted taxable income figure referred to as alternative minimum taxable
income. An individual subject to the alternative minimum tax is taxed under a two tiered
graduated rate structure with 26 and 28 percent as the rates. I.R.C. §§ 55 – 59.
132 Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual Income
Tax System, 91 Tax Notes 1415 (Special Supp. , May 28, 2001).
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A. Compensation for Services
There are several tax effects produced by the payment of compensation by
a corporation to an employee. First, the corporation can deduct amounts paid
that are reasonable for the services rendered to it.133 Any amounts received by
the employee-owner as compensation count as gross income to him, triggering
an income tax liability.134 In addition, because the compensation qualifies as
wages from employment, it also triggers an employment tax liability under
FICA, with the employee and the corporation each being responsible for half the
tax. The corporation is entitled to deduct its half of the tax paid.135 That would
reduce the income that is subject to the corporate tax, lowering the income tax
liability of the business.136 The following sections quantify the amount of tax
owed or saved as a result of each of these effects.
1. Employment Tax Effects
The corporation will have to pay an amount equal to 6.2% of the bonus to
cover its half of the OASDI component of the FICA tax. Thus, it will owe $930 on
a $15,000 bonus payment.137 Meanwhile, the employee would also have to pay
$930 to cover his portion of the tax on that bonus. Because the bonus is well
below the contribution and benefit base, there is no possibility that any portion
of the bonus would be exempt from the OASDI component of the tax.
The corporation and the employee-shareholder will each have to pay a
1.45% tax on the bonus to cover the hospital insurance component of FICA.
Thus, a $15,000 bonus will cost the company $218 in tax, and it will also cost the
employee-shareholder $218 in tax.138
2. Corporate Income Tax Effects

133

I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
135 I.R.C. § 162(a).
136 The amount of compensation paid would have ancillary consequences. If the
corporation pays for health insurance for the employee and his family, the deduction available to
the corporation could depend on the amount paid to the employee. In addition, the amount that
the owner employee can receive as deferred compensation depends in part on the amount of
compensation the owner employee receives. These ancillary consequences are not taken into
account in the analysis.
137 $15,000 × 6.2% = $930.
138 $15,000 × 1.45% = $218.
134
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The corporation will be entitled to deduct from gross income any
compensation it pays to its employee-owner.139 In addition, the corporation will
be entitled to deduct its share of any employment tax on that compensation.140
These deductions will translate into a lower corporate income tax liability. The
actual tax savings will depend on the tax that would otherwise be due on income
that is offset by the deductions.
Because the corporate tax is imposed under a system of graduated
marginal rates, the tax savings will depend on the tax bracket into which the
corporation falls in the year it makes the payments. As previously discussed,
there are six marginal rates, ranging from a low of 15 percent to a high of 39
percent. At the low end of the spectrum, if the corporation is in the 15 percent
bracket, $15,000 in business profits (unreduced by any bonus payment) would
cost the corporation $2,250 in income tax.141 Conversely, if the corporation uses
that money to pay a deductible bonus, there is no income left to be taxed,
resulting in no income tax liability for the corporation on that money. Thus, a
$15,000 bonus payment would translate into $2,250 in tax savings for a
corporation in the 15 percent tax bracket. Meanwhile, at the high end of the
spectrum, the same $15,000 bonus would translate into $5,850 of tax savings to a
corporation in the 39 percent tax bracket.142
The corporation would also be entitled to deduct any employment tax it
must pay on any bonus paid to an employee. Like the deduction for the bonus
itself, this deduction will also translate into tax savings that will vary with the
corporation’s marginal tax rate. There is a $930 tax to cover the OASDI
component of the FICA tax.143 That translates into $140 in tax savings if the
corporation is in the 15 percent marginal tax bracket.144 The savings top off at
$363 if the corporation is in the 39 percent marginal tax bracket.145 For the health
insurance component of the FICA tax, any $15,000 of compensation would cost
the corporation $218 in tax that the corporation could deduct in computing its
taxable income.146 If the corporation is in the 15 percent tax bracket, that $218
deduction corresponds to $33 in income tax savings.147 Meanwhile, if the
corporation is in the 39 percent tax bracket, that $218 deduction corresponds to
$85 in income tax savings.148

139

I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). If the corporation were publicly traded, the deduction for salaries
paid to certain executives would be limited to $1 million. I.R.C. § 162(m).
140 I.R.C. § 162(a).
141 $15,000 × 15% = $2,250.
142 $15,000 × 39% = $5,850.
143 Supra note 137.
144 $930 × 15% = $140.
145 $930 × 39% = $363.
146 Supra note 138.
147 $218 × 15% = $33.
148 $218 × 39% = $85.
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3. Individual Income Tax Effects
Any bonus received by the employee-shareholder will be included in his
gross income and subject to tax under the system of graduated marginal rates
previously described.149 For 2003 through 2010, the statute uses six marginal
rates, ranging from a low of 10 percent to a high of 35 percent. After 2010, the
pre-2001 marginal rate structure takes effect. It consisted of five marginal rates
ranging from a low of 15 percent to a high of 39.6 percent. Thus, the income tax
cost associated with the receipt of a bonus will depend on two things. First, it
will depend on the year when the employee-shareholder receives the bonus.
Second, it will depend on the employee-shareholder’s marginal rate tax bracket
in that year. Assuming the $15,000 bonus is received in 2006, the individual will
have to pay as little as $1,500 in tax if he is in the 10 percent tax bracket.150
However, that $15,000 bonus will cost him as much as $5,250 in income tax if he
is in the 35 percent tax bracket.151
The following table summarizes the net savings and costs on a $15,000
bonus paid by the corporation to the shareholder in 2003 through 2010. The net
effect varies depending on two factors: the corporation’s marginal tax rate and
the shareholder’s marginal tax rate.
$15,000 Bonus Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
2003 through 2010
Corp. Rate
15%
25%
34%
35%
38%
39%

10%
($1,373)
$242
$1,695
$1,857
$2,341
$2,503

Shareholder Marginal Rate
15%
25%
28%
33%
($2,123) ($3,623) ($4,073) ($4,823)
($508) ($2,008) ($2,458) ($3,208)
$945
($555) ($1,005) ($1,755)
$1,107
($393)
($843) ($1,593)
$1,591
$91
($359) ($1,109)
$1,753
$253
($197)
($947)

35%
($5,123)
($3,508)
($2,055)
($1,893)
($1,409)
($1,247)

Among other things, the table shows that there are situations in which the
corporation and employee-shareholder collectively save more in taxes than they
owe. The combined net savings is as high as $2,503 when the corporation is in
the 39 percent marginal tax bracket and the shareholder is in the 10 percent
marginal tax bracket. As a practical matter, however, that particular paring of
tax brackets represents an anomalous situation.152 Meanwhile, in the vast
149

See discussion accompanying notes 26 through 31.
$15,000 × 10% = $1,500.
151 $15,000 × 35% = $5,250.
152 The 10 percent tax bracket applies when an individual has taxable income that does
not exceed $15,100. That would mean that virtually all of the individual’s other income was
offset by exemptions, exclusions and deductions of one kind or another. The 39 percent tax
150
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majority of situations, the payment of compensation produces a net tax cost. The
cost tops out at $5,123 when the corporation is in the 15 percent marginal tax
bracket and the shareholder is in the 35 percent marginal tax bracket.
After 2010, the range of outcomes will change because the existing
schedule of marginal income tax rates that applies to individuals will be replaced
with the schedule that had been in effect prior to 2001. That schedule used five
rates ranging from 15 percent to 39.6 percent. This change will alter the calculus
by increasing what the shareholder must pay in tax on the bonus. That will
increase the combined net tax cost, or eliminate any combined net tax savings,
that would have otherwise occurred under the existing schedule of marginal
rates. The following table summarizes the range of outcomes produced after
2010 on the assumption that the pre-2001 schedule of marginal rates takes effect.
$15,000 Bonus Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
After 2010
Corp. Rate
15%
25%
34%
35%
38%
39%

15%
($2,123)
($508)
$945
$1,107
$1,591
$1,753

Shareholder Marginal Rate
28%
31%
36%
($4,073) ($4,523) ($5,273)
($2,458) ($2,908) ($3,658)
($1,005) ($1,455) ($2,205)
($843) ($1,293) ($2,043)
($359)
($809) ($1,559)
($197)
($647) ($1,397)

39.6%
($5,813)
($4,198)
($2,745)
($2,583)
($2,099)
($1,937)

The combined net tax effects associated with a bonus must be compared to
the combined net tax effects associated with a dividend. The following section
computes the combined tax cost incurred by a corporation and its shareholder on
the payment of a dividend.
B. Dividends
A payment of dividends triggers a different, and less complex, set of tax
effects to the corporation and its employee-shareholder. Understandably, there
are no employment tax effects to consider. In addition, because the corporation
is not entitled to deduct any dividends paid to shareholders, there are no
corporate income tax effects to consider. The only income tax effects will occur
at the level of the employee-shareholder.
Dividends received by the employee-owner will count as gross income to
153
him.
As such they will be subject to tax. As described above, the amount of
bracket applies when a corporation has taxable income over $100,000 and up to $335,000. I.R.C. §
11(b).
153 I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
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tax will depend on two factors: the year of payment, and, where applicable,
whether the dividend is a qualified dividend.154 This analysis assumes that any
dividend received by the employee-owner will be a qualified dividend whenever
applicable. For 2003 through 2007, qualified dividends are taxable at one of two
rates, depending on the marginal tax rate that applies to the recipient’s ordinary
income. If the recipient is in the 25 percent bracket or higher, a qualified
dividend is taxed at 15 percent.155 If the recipient is any other tax bracket, a
qualified dividend is taxed at 5 percent.156 In 2008, dividends are tax free to any
recipient in a tax bracket below 25 percent, while the tax on dividends remains at
15 percent in all other cases.157 The preferential rates that apply to qualified
dividends are scheduled to expire after 2008. 158 Thus, the dividends would be
subject to tax under the system of marginal rates that apply to all ordinary
income.
This array of transitory rules makes it necessary to compute the combined
net tax effects for many different periods of time. A $15,000 dividend paid in
2003 through 2007 will have a net tax cost of $2,250 if the recipient in the 25
percent or higher marginal tax bracket. The net tax cost will be $750 if the
recipient is below the 25 percent tax bracket. The following table summarizes the
full range of outcomes.
$15,000 Dividend Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
2003 through 2007
Corp. Rate
All rates

10%
($750)

Shareholder Marginal Rate
15%
25%
28%
33%
($750) ($2,250) ($2,250) ($2,250)

35%
($2,250)

A $15,000 dividend paid in 2008 will continue to have a net tax cost of
$2,250 if the recipient is in the 25 percent or higher marginal tax bracket.
However, there will be no tax cost if the recipient is below the 25 percent tax
bracket. The following table summarizes the full range of outcomes.
$15,000 Dividend Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
2008
Corp. Rate

10%

Shareholder Marginal Rate
15%
25%
28%
33%

35%

154

See discussion accompanying notes 25 through 35.
I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C).
156 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B).
157 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B).
158 The Bush administration has proposed making permanent the preferential rates of tax
that apply to qualified dividends.
155
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All rates

$0

$0

($2,250)

($2,250)

($2,250)

($2,250)

A $15,000 dividend paid in 2009 and 2010 will have a net tax cost that will
depend on the recipient’s marginal tax bracket. The net tax cost will be as little
as $1,500 if the recipient is in the 10 percent tax bracket. The net tax cost will be
as much as $5,250 if the recipient is in the 35 percent tax bracket. The following
table summarizes the full range of outcomes.
$15,000 Dividend Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
2009 and 2010
Corp. Rate
All rates

10%
($1,500)

Shareholder Marginal Rate
15%
25%
28%
33%
($2,250) ($3,750) ($4,200) ($4,950)

35%
($5,250)

A $15,000 dividend paid after 2011 will continue to have a net tax cost that
depends on the recipient’s marginal tax bracket. However, because the pre-2001
tax brackets will replace the ones now in effect, the range of outcomes will be
different. At the low end of the spectrum, there will be a net tax cost of $2,250 if
the recipient is in the 15 percent tax bracket. The net tax cost will be as high as
$5,940 if the recipient is in the 39.6 percent tax bracket. The following chart
summarizes the full range of outcomes.
$15,000 Dividend Paid by Corporation to Shareholder
Combined Tax Savings (Cost)
After 2010
Corp. Rate
All rates

15%
($2,250)

Shareholder Marginal Rate
28%
31%
36%
($4,200) ($4,650) ($5,400)

39.6%
($5,940)

C. Quantifying the Incentive
The difference between the combined net tax effects associated with each
payout alternative will determine the extent to which there is a tax incentive for
structuring a payout as one or the other. Because the combined net tax effects
produced in any case varies depending on a number of transitory rules, any
comparison between the two payout options is valid for only a discrete period of
time. This analysis proceeds accordingly, starting with an analysis of the period
covered by 2003 through 2007.
In 2003 through 2007, qualified dividends are taxed as long term capital
gains, and ordinary income is subject to tax under a temporary schedule of
marginal rates ranging from 10 percent to 35 percent. The following table shows
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the extent to which the corporation and the shareholder collectively save more,
or pay more, in tax when a $15,000 payout is structured as a bonus instead of a
dividend.
Tax Advantage of Paying $15,000
as a Bonus instead of Dividends
2003 through 2007
Corp. Rate
15%
25%
34%
35%
38%
39%

10%
($623)
$992
$2,445
$2,607
$3,091
$3,253

Shareholder Marginal Rate
15%
25%
28%
33%
($1,373) ($1,373) ($1,823) ($2,573)
$242
$242
($208)
($958)
$1,695
$1,695
$1,245
$495
$1,857
$1,857
$1,407
$657
$2,341
$2,341
$1,891
$1,141
$2,503
$2,503
$2,053
$1,303

35%
($2,873)
($1,258)
$195
$357
$841
$1,003

The table indicates that a dividend costs more in tax than doesa bonus in
the vast majority of situations. For instance, a $15,000 bonus enjoys a $1,003 tax
advantage over a $15,000 dividend when the shareholder is in the 35 percent
marginal tax bracket and the corporation is in the 39 percent marginal tax
bracket. In other words, in that situation the corporation and shareholder end up
with $1,003 more after tax by structuring the payout as a bonus as opposed to a
dividend. However, there is a range of situations when a dividend enjoys a tax
advantage over a bonus. Specifically, that advantage exists whenever the
corporation is in the 15 percent marginal tax bracket. It also exists when the
corporation is in the 25 percent tax bracket and the shareholder is in one of the
three highest income brackets. In those situations, there is a financial incentive to
substitute a dividend for a bonus in order to minimize the net tax cost to the
shareholder and corporation. The following chart depicts the range of outcomes
graphically.
Figure 1
Tax Advantage to Paying $15,000
As a Bonus instead of Dividends
2003 - 2007
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Corporation's Marginal Tax Rate
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38%
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33%
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The bars that rise above the zero dollar line represent the cases when a
$15,000 bonus costs less tax than a dividend of the same amount. Conversely,
the bars that fall below the zero dollar line represent cases when a $15,000
dividend costs less than a bonus of the same amount. Thus, a shareholderemployee in the 35 percent tax bracket will pay less in tax on a bonus, compared
to a dividend, when the corporation is in any tax bracket above 25 percent.
However, that same shareholder-employee will pay less in tax on a dividend,
compared to a bonus, when the corporation is in any tax bracket below 34
percent. The length of the bar corresponds to the amount of tax dollars saved in
any given case. Thus, if the shareholder is in the 35 percent tax bracket and the
corporation is in the 15 percent tax bracket, a dividend will cost nearly $3,000 less
in tax compared to a bonus.
The graph makes it easier to appreciate the distribution of benefits that are
available when a dividend is substituted for a bonus. Individuals in the three
highest income brackets can save tax dollars by making the substitution in a
wider range of situations. In addition, when they do so, they save far more in
taxes than their lower income counterparts do. In effect, the can rich get richer
when they work for free for a corporation they own and control.
The range of outcomes changes slightly in 2008 when qualified dividends
are tax exempt to anyrecipient whose ordinary income is taxed below 25
percent. Because the change in the law reduces the cost associated with making
a dividend, the incentive to substitute a dividend for a bonus operates in a

34

Working for Free
greater number of cases affected by the tax cut. The following table quantifies
the economic incentive to make the dividend-for-bonus substitution in 2008.
Tax Advantage of Paying $15,000
as a Bonus instead of Dividends
in 2008
Corp. Rate
15%
25%
34%
35%
38%
39%

10%
($1,373)
$242
$1,695
$1,857
$2,341
$2,503

Shareholder Marginal Rate
15%
25%
28%
33%
($2,123) ($1,373) ($1,823) ($2,573)
($508)
$242
($208)
($958)
$945
$1,695
$1,245
$495
$1,107
$1,857
$1,407
$657
$1,591
$2,341
$1,891
$1,141
$1,753
$2,503
$2,053
$1,303

35%
($2,873)
($1,258)
$195
$357
$841
$1,003

The chart shows that if the employee-shareholder is in the 15 percent tax
bracket, there will be an incentive to substitute a dividend for a bonus in cases
where the corporation is in the 25 percent tax bracket. The following chart
depicts the full range of outcomes graphically, permitting one to more easily
appreciate the distribution of benefits available under a dividend-for-bonus
substitution.
Figure 2

Tax Advantage to Paying $15,000
In Compensation instead of Dividends
2008
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Prior to 2008, the dividend-for-bonus substitution produced more tax
savings more frequently as the employee-shareholder moved into higher income
tax brackets. The temporary dividend tax exemption that applies to 2008 makes
it possible for some lower income individuals to save more tax dollars in a
greater number of cases than they would have otherwise. However, individuals
in the highest income brackets continue to enjoy the lion’s share of any tax
savings by working for free.
If the temporary dividend tax cut expires after 2008, as scheduled, the
incentive to substitute dividends for a bonus disappears. The following table
shows the extent to which the corporation and the shareholder collectively save
when a $15,000 payout is structured as a bonus instead of a dividend after 2008.
Tax Advantage of Paying $15,000
as a Bonus instead of Dividends
2009 and 2010
Corp. Rate
15%
25%
34%
35%
38%
39%

10%
$127
$1,742
$3,195
$3,357
$3,841
$4,003

Shareholder Marginal Rate
15%
25%
28%
33%
$127
$127
$127
$127
$1,742
$1,742
$1,742
$1,742
$3,195
$3,195
$3,195
$3,195
$3,357
$3,357
$3,357
$3,357
$3,841
$3,841
$3,841
$3,841
$4,003
$4,003
$4,003
$4,003

35%
$127
$1,742
$3,195
$3,357
$3,841
$4,003
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The following chart depicts the outcomes graphically.
Figure 3
Tax Advantage to Paying $15,000
In Compensation instead of Dividends
In 2009 and 2010
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The chart underscores the fact that once the dividend tax cuts expire, there
is no tax related incentive to pay a dividend as disguised compensation. In effect
the tradeoffs that had been in effect before the tax cuts were introduced will
apply again. Furthermore the incentive to substitute a dividend for a bonus will
not exist after 2010 either, when the marginal income tax schedule that had been
in effect prior to 2001 will apply. The following table summarizes the extent to
which a $15,000 bonus has a tax advantage over a $15,000 dividend after 2010.
Tax Advantage of Paying $15,000
as a Bonus instead of Dividends
After 2010
Corp. Rate
15%
25%
34%
35%
38%
39%

15%
$127
$1,742
$3,195
$3,357
$3,841
$4,003

Shareholder Marginal Rate
28%
31%
36%
$127
$127
$127
$1,742
$1,742
$1,742
$3,195
$3,195
$3,195
$3,357
$3,357
$3,357
$3,841
$3,841
$3,841
$4,003
$4,003
$4,003

39.6%
$127
$1,742
$3,195
$3,357
$3,841
$4,003
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The following chart depicts these outcomes graphically.
Figure 4
Tax Advantage to Paying $15,000
In a Bonus instead of Dividends
After 2010
Corporation's Marginal Tax Rate
15%

25%

34%

35%

38%

39%

$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0
($1,000)
($2,000)
15%

28%

31%

36%

39.6%

Shareholder's Marginal Tax Rate

D. The Unequal Opportunity Tax Loophole
It seems clear that any tax savings to be realized by substituting dividends
for a bonus will be enjoyed primarily by high income individuals. As the charts
and tables show the most tax savings occur when the employee-shareholder is in
the highest tax brackets and the corporation is in the two lowest tax brackets.
There is no evidence that concretely shows the extent to which high income
individuals own and control corporations that make low incomes. However
there is compelling evidence that ownership of closely held corporations is
severely concentrated in the hands of most wealthy individuals. It also seems
clear that all but a small minority of corporations have incomes low enough to
place them in one of the two lowest tax brackets.
The available evidence shows that the stock in closely held corporations is
concentrated in the hands of very wealthy individuals. The Internal Revenue
Service estimates that there were 6.5 million individuals in the U.S. with at least
$625,000 in gross assets in 1998, representing 3.4 percent of the total U.S. adult
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population.159 Nearly 1.3 million of this group of wealthy individuals,
representing nearly 20 percent of the total, owned stock in non-publicly traded
corporations.160 The total value of this stock was estimated to be over $1.3
trillion. However, such stock ownership was concentrated in the hands of the
very wealthy.
Individuals whose personal net worth exceeded $2.5 million accounted for
10.5 percent of wealthy individuals, but they owned 73.5 percent of all stock in
non
- publicly traded corporations. Individuals whose personal net worth
exceeded $5 million accounted for 3.8 percent of all wealthy individuals, but they
owned 59.8 percent of all stock in non-publicly traded corporations. The
following table details the distribution of non-publicly traded stock among
individuals whose gross assets exceed $625,000.
Ownership of Non-Publicly Traded Stock
by Owner’s Size of Net Worth
1998

Size of Net Worth

Number
in
Class
(000)

$20,000,000 or more
$10,000,000 under $20,000,000
$5,000,000 under $10,000,000
$2,500,000 under $5,000,000
$1,000,000 under $2,500,000
$600,000 under $1,000,000
Under $600,000
Less than Zero

29
51
166
440
2,058
2,494
1,253
39

TOTAL

6,530

% to
Total

0.4%
0.8%
2.5%
6.7%
31.5%
38.2%
19.2%
0.6%

Total
Value
of Stock
(000,000)
453,989
138,892
198,902
182,806
236,900
79,012
31,493
3,087

% to
Total

34.3%
10.5%
15.0%
13.8%
17.9%
6.0%
2.4%
0.2%

1,325,081

Not only are closely held corporations more frequently owned by the
wealthy, the evidence suggest that the vast majority of corporations have low
incomes.
Statistics compiled by the Internal Revenue Service show that small
corporations (measured by size of assets) account for the overwhelming share of
all active corporations. Active corporations with less than $5 million in assets
accounted for over 97 percent of all corporations in 2002. Moreover, it appears to
be unusual when the income generated by these corporations is high enough to
159

Barry W. Johnson and Lisa M. Schreiber, Personal Wealth, 1998, Statistics of Income
Bulletin (Winter 1998) at 87.
160 Id. At 103, tbl. 1.

39

Working for Free
put place them outside the 15 percent tax bracket, which applies to income up to
$50,000. The average income for corporations with less than $500,000 in assets
was $10,909. The average income for corporations with assets falling between
$500,000 and $1 million was $20,407. The average income for corporations with
assets falling between $1 million and $5 million was $48,154. The following table
shows the full distribution of corporations for 2002.161

Asset Size

Active Corporations with Assets
2002
% to
Number
Total

$1 under $500,000
$500,000 under $1,000,000
$1,000,000 under $5,000,000
$5,000,000 under $10,000,000
$10,000,000 under $25,000,000
$25,000,000 under $50,000,000
$50,000,000 under $100,000,000
$100,000,000 under $250,000,000
$250,000,000 under $500,000,000
$500,000,000 under $2,500,000,000
$2,500,000,000 or more

3,825,530
344,464
369,682
57,408
36,819
13,904
9,344
8,595
4,226
4,958
1,909

TOTAL

4,676,839

81.8%
7.4%
7.9%
1.2%
0.8%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.0%

Net Income
(000)

Average
Net Income

41,734,405
7,029,441
17,801,498
8,429,533
4,805,044
5,527,357
5,781,520
10,110,897
16,452,094
83,007,982
377,525,169

10,909
20,407
48,154
146,836
130,504
397,537
618,741
1,176,370
3,893,065
16,742,231
197,760,696

578,204,940

Thus, the opportunity to save taxes by substituting dividends for
compensation is not an abstract matter. Working for free is a very real option
confronted by what appears to be a substantial number of individuals who own
and control a corporation that employs them. What’s more, there is compelling
evidence that the opportunity to save tax taxes is not shared uniformly within
the universe of owners of closely held businesses. The rich stand more to gain,
and there appearsto be very few other individuals who are in a position to
exploit this opportunity. In a very real sense, the dividend tax cut has
inadvertently created a rich man’s tax loophole that reduces employment tax

161

See IRS, Statistics of Income Bulletin, Summer 2005, tbl. 1 at 75. The statistics include
data for both S corporations and C corporations. S corporations account for approximately 60
percent of all active corporations. They also accounted for 32.6 percent of the net income
generated by all corporations in 2002. See Kelly Lutrell, S Corporation Returns, 2002, Statistics of
Income Bulletin (Spring 2005) 59, figure D at 63, and Heather Duffy, Corporation Income Tax
Returns, 2002, Statistics of Income Bulletin (Summer 2005) 67, table 1, at 75. It is not possible to
adjust the data to reflect solely the distribution and activity of C corporations. However, even
under the most conservative of assumptions, the evidence shows that all but a small minority of
C corporations have income high enough to be taxed above the 15 percent and the 25 percent tax
brackets.
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receipts at precisely the time when the social security and Medicare trust funds
need the money more than ever.
V.

Exposing and Reforming Employment Tax Defects

There is no economic incentive to substitute a dividend for a bonus after
the dividend tax cut expires. However, even in that situation, the corporate form
offers employment tax advantages that other forms of doing business do not.
Most important, a corporation can control when (if ever) the employment tax is
triggered. There is no employment tax liability as long as the corporation does
not pay compensation to an employee-owner. In the event compensation is paid,
the employment tax liability will be based on the amount paid. Moreover,
because compensation in excess of the FICA contribution and benefit base is
exempt from the OASDI component of the tax, employment taxes could be saved
by compressing multiple years worth of compensation into a single year. Thus,
if the owner received $180,000 in compensation in 2006, only $94,200 would be
subject to the 12.4 percent OASDI tax. The rest would be exempt from that tax,
even though it may relate to services performed during a year when the
corporation did not pay the owner a salary. Therefore, even when the
employment tax is triggered, the tax liability can be managed and minimized by
an individual who owns and controls the corporation that employs him.
The JCT Staff proposal virtually eliminates any opportunity for
understating employment tax liability when an individual owns and works for a
business conducted through a flow through entity. That individual is subject to
employment tax on any amounts paid as compensation and on the individual’s
share of the profits of the business. However, the JCT Staff proposal leaves in
place the opportunities to understate employment tax liability when an
individual owns and works for a business conducted through a corporation.
Such an individual is only subject to employment tax on amounts actually paid
as compensation. Allowing this rule to remain in effect ignores the full range of
opportunities to control and minimize employment tax liability when a self
employed individual operates through a corporation.
It makes little sense to have the employment tax liability of an individual
depend on the business form through which the business is conducted.
However, that is exactly what happens now, and it will continue to happen (with
less frequency) in the event the JCT Staff proposal is adopted. Formal
distinctions appear to matter least in the case of a closely held business, where
the interests of the business and a controlling employee-owner are not adverse.
Transactions between the two parties are unlikely to occur at arms length. The
JCT Staff proposal prevents the employment tax from being a victim of selfdealing when a flow-through entity is used to conduct a business. However, the
employment tax falls victim to self dealing when an individual operates his
business through a corporation. Not only does this represent an undesirable tax
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planning opportunity, it can cause taxpayers who are in economically similar
situations to be treated differently, solely because the rules operate by reference
to irrelevant legal formalities.
Federal employment tax rules would produce more sensible and uniform
outcomes if economic realities, not legal formalities, played a greater role in
determining how the rules apply. There are real and compelling ways for
individuals to understate their employment tax liability when they own a
corporation that employs them. These opportunities are more likely to be
exploited when the individual is in a position to influence decisions by the
corporation. Thus, any approach to address this situation should consider the
extent to which such opportunities to exercise and exploit control exist. As a
general proposition, such opportunities occur in the closely-held corporation.
The JCT Staff proposal could be improved if its rules were made to apply
to individuals who own and work for closely held corporations. There are
several ways to define a closely held corporation. However, there are already a
number of instances in which a corporation is considered to be closely held for
income tax purposes if the corporation satisfies the stock ownership test
contained in the personal holding company rules.162 Under that test, a
corporation would be considered closely held if five or fewer individuals own
more than 50 percent of the stock of the corporation during the last six months of
the taxable year.163
Whenever a corporation qualifies as a closely held corporation, then the
rules of SECA should apply to determine the employment tax liability of any
owner, as follows. First, the tax should apply to the investor’s share of the
corporation’s earnings for any given year and to any amounts paid to the owner
as compensation for services rendered. A corporation is already required to
compute its earnings and profits.164 The earnings and profits generated in any
given year would be used to determine an employee-shareholder’s share. That
share would be a function of the shareholder’s interest in the corporation as
measured by sock owned. Thus, if the employee-shareholder owned 40 percent
of the stock in a year that the corporation generated $160,000 in earnings and
profits, $64,000 of that amount would represent that individual’s share of the
corporation’s earnings.165 In addition, the self-employment tax would apply to
any amounts actually paid to that individual as compensation. However, if the
shareholder does not materially participate in the business, only amounts
actually paid to him as reasonable compensation would be subject to the SECA
tax. This approach would establish near complete parity in the way the rules
162 The personal holding company stock ownership test is incorporated in the at risk
rules. I.R.C. § 465. The test is also incorporated in the passive activity loss limitation rules. I.R.C.
§ 469A.
163 See I.R.C. § 542(a)(2).
164 I.R.C. § 312.
165 $160,000 × 40% = $64,000.
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operate, regardless of the legal entity through which an individual conducts a
business.
The JCT Staff proposal applies two sets of rules to determine the extent to
which the profits of the business are subject to employment tax. For all
businesses other than a service business, the employment tax applies only to the
investor’s share of earnings other than certain passive income items that are
already excluded from the definition of net earnings from self-employment.
However, if the business is in a service business, no such adjustment is made.166
The distinction between service and non-service business should apply with
equal force when the business is conducted through a corporation.
The suggestions just proposed offer a number of advantages. First, they
would reduce the opportunities for undesirable tax planning that can
shortchange the federal government in one way or another. Second, they would
promote greater consistency in the way taxpayers are treated, resulting in more
sensible outcomes. Finally, they would extend an element of economic reality to
the way closely held businesses are addressed by federal tax law.
There are a number of instances in which special rules already apply to
prevent taxpayers from exploiting opportunities to utilize corporations to avoid
or evade tax. This is accomplished in a number of ways. In some cases the
approach is not to treat the corporation as a separate and distinct taxpaying unit.
In other cases, the approach is simply to penalize or eliminate any advantage that
may be gained by using a corporation as an element in a particular arrangement.
In all instances, however, there is an element of economic reality that informs the
approach.
A.

Use of Multiple Corporations

As a general rule, a corporation is considered to be a separate tax paying
unit. However, a corporation’s independent tax status may be disregarded if
that corporation and one or more others are under common control. It is more
likely that the higher marginal tax rates would kick in when income is
consolidated in one corporation. Using multiple corporations to generate the
same income could effectively fracture that income. If structured properly, such
an arrangement could prevent the higher tax rates from coming into play if the
amount of income generated by each commonly controlled corporation did not
exceed the $50,000 threshold that applies to the 15 percent marginal tax bracket.
To guard against this hazard, all corporations under common control are treated
as one for purposes of computing the income tax on their total income. 167
166 The JCT Staff proposal employs an existing definition of a service business. Under
that definition, a service business is one in which substantially all of the activities involve the
performance of services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting,
actuarial science, performing arts or consulting. I.R.C. § 448(d)(2)(A).
167 I.R.C. § 1561(a).
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The rule essentially denies the benefit associated with the use of a
corporation to engage in a business. In addition the rule acknowledges the
economic realities behind the use of multiple corporations by a common owner.
In a similar fashion, the proposal advanced above acknowledges the need to
disregard the separate existence of the corporation when it is owned and
controlled by someone who works for it. In addition, the proposal takes an
approach that prevents someone from using a corporation to minimize or
eliminate a tax liability that would otherwise apply.
B.

Personal Services Corporation

As a general rule, a corporation and its owner are two separate and
distinct taxpaying units. However, if the principal activity of the corporation is
to perform personal services that are actually performed by a 10 percent owner,
the Internal Revenue Service can reallocate items between the corporation and its
owner, provided the arrangement was used to avoid tax.168 Any allocation made
by the government must be necessary to prevent avoidance or evasion of federal
income tax or to clearly reflect the income of the corporation or its employeeowner.169 The statute effectively acknowledges that transactions between a
corporation and someone who controls it may not occur on an arm’s length basis.
To address this possibility, the statute enables the Internal Revenue Service to
disregard the actual form of a transaction and to make reallocations that reflect
the economic realities.
The proposal advanced in this article operates in a similar way. It
manifestly acknowledges that transactions between corporations and the owners
who control them should not be taken at face value. Thus, a payment that takes
the form of a dividend should not be treated as such if it in fact constitutes
disguised compensation for services rendered. Moreover, even if a payment is
made in the form of compensation, the amount paid may bear little or no
resemblance to the economic realities. Those economic realities may be difficult
to determine in any situation where an individual is both and owner and an
employee of a business. Because the earnings of the business may represent both
a return on the individual’s capital investment and a product of the individual’s
labor, distinguishing one from the other may be arbitrary. But any method used
168

I.R.C. § 269A(b). This rule does not authorize the Secretary to make a reallocation in
the case under review. First, because the statute limits the Secretary’s reallocation powers to
cases involving the possible avoidance or evasion of federal income tax, the Secretary has no
power to make a reallocation where the employment tax may be avoided or evaded. Second,
even if the power were available to address possible evasion or avoidance of the employment tax,
the power could only be exercised when the corporation performs services for one other
corporation, partnership or other entity. As a result, the power cannot be applied to address the
employee owner of a corporation that performs services for more than one corporation,
partnership or other entity.
169 I.R.C. § 269A (a) (flush language).
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to make the distinction should be applied to in all cases. The JCT Staff proposal
uses an approach that appears to enjoy widespread appeal. However, that
proposal only applies its approach in the context of flow-through business
entities. The proposal described above merely extends that approach to closely
held corporations, resulting in uniform standard.
C.

Qualified Personal Service Corporations

As a general rule, the income of a corporation is taxed under a system of
graduated marginal rates. Under this system, the taxable income of a
corporation falls into several layers, each one being subject to a (generally) higher
rate that applied to the one below it. In many cases, this system will cause at
least a portion of the corporation’s income to be taxed at a rate as low as 15
percent, even if the corporation may have enough income to put it in a higher
rate bracket. However, all of a corporation’s income is taxed at a flat 35 percent if
the corporation is a “qualified personal service corporation.” 170 A corporation
acquires that status if substantially all of its activities involve the performance of
services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting,
actuarial science, performing arts, or consulting.171 The rule effectively prevents
a corporation from enjoying the tax savings it would otherwise enjoy of the
graduated rates were allowed to apply.
In the absence of the rule, an individual in a high income bracket could
divert a portion of his income to a corporation, where a lower tax might be
imposed under the system of graduated marginal rates. A flat 35 percent tax on
all the income of the corporation reduces or eliminates any savings that might
otherwise be gained by an individual using a corporation to operate a service
business. In a similar way, the modifications suggested to the JCT Staff proposal
eliminate any employment tax savings that might otherwise be gained in
situations where an individual operates a business through a corporation.
D.

Personal Holding Company Tax

The personal holding company tax represents an instance in which the
law imposes a penalty when a corporation is used in a way to minimize or avoid
a tax that would otherwise apply. As explained above, the hallmark of the
corporate tax system is the fact that profits are taxed first when earned by the
corporation and again when distributed to shareholders. However, the
shareholder level tax will not come into play if the earnings are not distributed.
The personal holding company tax operates to penalize a corporation in certain

170
171

I.R.C. § 11(b)(2).
I.R.C. § 448(d)(2)(A).
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situations when profits are not distributed. The amount of the penalty is equal to
what the shareholders would have paid.172
The penalty tax can only apply if ownership of the corporation is
concentrated. Specifically, more than half of the value of the corporation’s stock
must be owned by five or fewer individuals (and certain related parties) at any
time during the last half of the tax year.173 If the stock ownership test is met, the
second question is whether the corporation meets an income test, which requires
that at least 60 percent of the corporation’s gross income (after certain
adjustments) be passive type items, like dividends, interest, certain rents and
royalties.174
Because the personal holding company tax provisions consider whether
stock in the corporation is concentrated, they acknowledge the potential for
closely held corporations to operate in undesirable ways that widely held
corporations do not. In this case, the provisions address the risk that (primarily)
high income individuals would attempt to reduce their tax bill by transferring to
a corporation income producing assets. In the absence of the transfer, the income
from such assets would be subject to tax at the high marginal rates that apply to
the owner. However, the tax bill could be much less if the income was taxable to
a corporation where lower marginal tax rates would apply. Furthermore, if the
corporation never distributed the earnings, the shareholder tax that applies to
dividends would never come into play.
The personal holding company tax provisions essentially make it very
unattractive to use a corporation as a vehicle to separate an individual from
income that ought to be taxable to him. Under the current set of rules, and under
the proposal made by the JCT Staff, a corporation can operate as a vehicle that
separates an individual from income that ought to be subject to employment tax
as labor income. The suggestions made in this article prevent that from
happening. However, they do so without operating as a penalty. Instead, the
suggestions merely require all individuals in economically similar situations to
be subject to the same set of rules.
E.

Accumulated Earnings Tax

Even in situations where a corporation is not subject to the personal
holding company tax, it may nevertheless face a penalty for failing to pay
dividends to shareholders so as to prevent the shareholder level tax from
172 I.R.C. § 541. The penalty tax is not a substitute for the tax imposed on an actual
dividend received by a shareholder from the corporation. It is an additional levy. Thus, even
when a corporation pays the personal holding company tax, any later dividends paid by the
corporation will be taxed to the shareholder as usual.
173 I.R.C. § 542(a)(2). Attribution rules operate to cause a shareholder to constructively
own shares actually owned by certain related parties. I.R.C. § 544(a).
174 I.R.C. §§ 542(a)(1); 543.
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applying to its earnings. 175 Specifically, the Internal Revenue Service can assess
an accumulated earnings penalty tax on any corporation that accumulates
earnings beyond the reasonable needs of the business. 176 This power can be
exercises only in cases where there is evidence that the corporation was utilized
to avoid or evade the tax that shareholders would have to pay on dividends.177
The accumulated earnings tax represents one way to restrain the ability of
a corporation to control when the shareholder level tax comes into play. The
measure proposed by this article constitutes a different kind of mechanism
directed at a similar activity. Under current law and under the JCT Staff
proposal, the employment tax liability of a corporation’s owner-employee could
be controlled in undesirable ways. That power is eliminated under the measure
proposed in this paper, resulting in more uniform treatment of all employee owners whose economic situations are substantially the same.
VI.

Conclusion

Employment taxes account for a substantial portion of federal tax receipts.
Yet the tax is assessed and collected under an outdated set of rules that is in
desperate need of reform. Not only are there gaps in the law, the rules
themselves offer a number of opportunities for taxpayers to arrange their affairs
so as to prevent the tax from coming into play when it otherwise would.
Prior to the enactment of the temporary tax cut on dividends, the defects
in the employment tax scheme were severe enough. However, after those tax
cuts took effect, the defects have taken on greater significance because they
appear to jeopardize the government’s ability to collect the employment tax from
a substantial number of people. Specifically, high income individuals who own
and control corporations that employ them stand to save substantial amounts by
substituting dividends for compensation they would have otherwise received
from the business.
As it stands, there does not appear to be much tangible evidence that the
situation will change. The JCT Staff has advanced a sensible proposal that serves
as a very helpful framework for addressing the problem. However, there does
not seem to be much interest in adopting it or any other measure directed at
addressing any of the well understood defects in the employment tax laws. The
last legislative measure was introduced during the Clinton administration. By
contrast, there have been repeated attempts by the Bush administration and
others to make permanent the dividend tax cuts, which create new and hard-toresist opportunities for the rich to underpay employment tax by exploiting
175 The tax does not apply if the following penalty taxes come into play: the personal
holding company tax imposed in section 542, the foreign personal holding company tax imposed
by section 552, the passive foreign investment company tax imposed by section 1297.
176 See I.R.C. § 537 describing how to measure the reasonable needs of the business.
177 See I.R.C. § 533.
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defects in the law. Those defects are already long overdue for correction. A very
bad situation will only be made much, much worse if the dividend tax cuts are
made permanent in the absence of legislation that eliminates the opportunity to
substitute a dividend for compensation. It doesn’t seem right that the rich
should be able to get richer at the government’s expense by working for free.
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